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Abstract 
The Multi-Agent Intrusion Detection System (MAIDS) is an agent based distributed 
intrusion detection system. It uses Software Engineering method to automate the procedure 
of generating intrusion detection software agents. A Software Fault Tree (SFT) description of 
Intrusion is converted to Colored Petri Net (CPN) by an eXtensible Markup Language (XSL) 
converter, then the CPN is translated to software agents using a compiler. The MAIDS is 
efficient, robust, extensible, easy to use. 
This paper presents the design and implementation of our approach that automatically 
transforms the SFT specifying an intrusion into a CPN representing intrusion detection 
system. It also presents the design and implementation of the infrastructure of MAIDS that is 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack resistant. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of computer intrusions and attacks has increased dramatically in the past 
few years. The incidents reported to CERT have almost doubled every year during the period 
from 1998 to 2001. In the first half of year 2002, the incidents reported were 43,136, which 
are almost the same as the number of incidents in the entire year 2001. It is widely believed 
that the number of the unreported incidents is even more. The average damage of the 
incidents has increased significantly since more and more companies rely heavily on 
computers and networks to develop and sell their services and products. As a result, 
computer security becomes a very important research and development area. 
1.1 Computer Security and Intrusion Detection 
A computer system needs to satisfy the following four mam security goals: 
Confidentiality, data are not disclosed to unauthorized users; Integrity, there is no 
unauthorized modification; Availability, computer resources, information and services are 
not withheld by unauthorized users; Policy, a sound policy for a computing system must be 
established and enforced in the design of the computer system. 
Intrusion prevention, detection and response are three most important measures to 
realize these security goals in computer system. Intrusion prevention includes defining a 
security model and implementing the system according to the security model, and using 
various sensors to scan vulnerabilities periodically. Intrusion detection includes monitoring 
the events happening in system, and detecting the intrusions when they happen. When an 
intrusion is detected, an intrusion response should take place. The ideal approach is to 
establish a security model that prevents any intrusions, but this is impractical since program 
bugs and human errors in operations and maintenances are unavoidable. So intrusion 
detection is prompted as a second line of defense to ensure security of the computer system. 
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1.2 Network Based and Host Based Intrusion Detection 
The Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be divided into two categories according 
to the data sources they use: network based intrusion detection systems and host based 
intrusion detection systems. 
Network based intrusion detection systems monitor the network traffic, examine the 
packets on the network and compare the content of the packets to certain signatures that 
indicate attacks. Network based intrusion detection system usually uses four common 
techniques to recognize intrusion: pattern and expression matching, frequency or threshold 
for certain criteria, event correlation and statistical anomaly detection [2]. 
Host based intrusion detection systems monitor the log files and audit files in system. 
When these files change, IDS compares the new log entries to attack signatures to find the 
match. 
The main advantages of a network based IDS are: 
Lower cost: For monitoring a single network with multiple host computers, only one 
network based IDS is needed. 
Real time detection: Network based IDS uses live network traffic for real time intrusion 
detection. Responses to intrusion are quicker than host based IDS. Since it detects intrusions 
in real time, it is more difficult for the attacker to remove evidence than host based IDS. 
Detecting of unsuccessful attack: By analyzing the network traffic, many unsuccessful 
attack attempts can be identified, so measures can be taken to prevent future attack. 
Detecting some attacks that host-based IDS cannot detect: Some attacks cannot be 
identified by host-based IDS, for example, network scanning. 
Operating system independence: Host based IDS needs to know the format of logs file and 
other features of the particular operating system on the monitored host, while network based 
IDS is independent of the operating systems. 
The main advantages of host based IDS are: 
Detect the intrusions between encrypted links: It is difficult to detect the intrusion by 
monitoring the link when the packets are all encrypted, but will be easier after the packets are 
decrypted on host. 
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Identify successful attack: The log files indicate what has happened in the host, so host 
based IDS can identify if the host is compromised and the attack is successful. 
Identify intrusions that network based IDS cannot detect: A network based IDS can 
detect many attacks from network, but it cannot detect an internal attack. For examples, an 
attack that is launched by a user who has access to the host, and attempts to access certain 
files without the corresponding access privilege. 
As the network based IDS and host based IDS complement each other, some hybrid 
intrusion detection systems combine the features of both types of IDS. For example, 
RealSecure 3.1, which is developed by Internet Security Systems (ISS), is a hybrid network-
based and host-based IDS with a single management architecture, seamless database, event 
management and reporting functions in one package [27]. 
In this paper, we present the Multi-Agent Intrusion Detection system (MAIDS), 
which employs intelligent mobile agent for detecting intrusion. In MAIDS, data from system 
log files, network traffic monitor and many other types of detection system can all be used as 
its data sources for intrusion detection. So it combines the advantages of both host-based IDS 
and network-based IDS. 
1.3 Contribution 
The traditional intrusion detection system has some pitfalls: 
First, false alarms rates are very high. Because the traditional pattern matching 
method cannot express complicated conditions for an intrusion, inaccurate models for 
intrusions are used, which causes high false alarm rate. 
Second, previous unknown intrusions is not easy to be detected. New intrusions are 
emerging every day. Anomaly intrusion detection system can detect some unknown 
intrusions by deciding whether current behavior follows a certain normal pattern or differs 
from known users' behavior patterns. For misuse intrusion detection system, intrusion 
signatures must be updated to detect previously unknown intrusion, but the work of updating 
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intrusion patterns is not easy to perform, so there is needs to have efficient way to update 
intrusion signatures. 
Third, IDS lacks the ability of correlating events. The correlation of events is not 
trivial because there are a huge number of related events from different hosts over a period of 
time. Some IDSs use data mining technique to correlate events in system, but they are 
complicated to update the signatures of new intrusions and are not very efficient [21]. 
Fourth, IDS provides little protection to itself. The attackers always want to disable 
IDS before their intrusive activities, so IDSs are often targets of attack. But current IDS 
provides no protection to itself, and Denial of Service (DoS) attack can bring down current 
IDS easily. 
The MAIDS is an agent based distributed intrusion detection system, which attempts 
to overcome the above-mentioned drawbacks. It uses software engineering method to define 
an accurate model of intrusion, so the false alarms are decreased dramatically. And it uses 
communication between software agents to correlate events happening in different systems, 
so the ability of correlation is improved. Also, the main goal of the project is to automate the 
procedure of generating intrusion detection software agents from Software Fault Tree (SFT) 
description of intrusions, making the system easy to update the signatures of new intrusions. 
An infrastructure for the IDS is designed to provide protection to the IDS itself from DoS 
attacks. 
The MAIDS system is a distributed intrusion detection system based on software 
agents. It uses SFT to model an intrusion, and uses Colored Petri Net (CPN) to specify the 
intrusion detection system and implements the CPN using software mobile agents. This paper 
focuses on solving the problem of automating the procedure of generating new agents for a 
new intrusion detection and developing an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) converter to 
convert a SFT to a CPN. This work also describes the design and implementation of an 
infrastructure to provide protection to the IDS. 
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1.4 Roadmap 
Section 2 reviews and discusses some related intrusion detection systems, algorithms 
and technologies. Section 3 introduces the structure of MAIDS, presents how to use SFT to 
represent intrusion, how to use CPN to specify intrusion detection system, the corresponding 
relationship between SFT and CPN, and the XML translator which is designed to do the 
conversion. The design of the infrastructure of MAIDS to protect it against attacks is also 
presented. Section 4 outlines the implementation of the system design. Section 5 shows the 
experiments and test results. Section 6 offers conclusions and ideas for future work. 
2. Related Work 
2.1 Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
Some sophisticated hackers use several machines to coordinate an attack, for 
examples, the famous FTP Bounce Attack. In recent years, some large scale coordinated 
attacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, increase dramatically. Hackers 
can obtain the tools from Internet that can easily launch these sophisticated attacks. In order 
to detect these distributed intrusions, much research and development effort is needed on 
distributed intrusion detection system. 
2.1.1 DIDS [3] 
Distributed Intrusion Detection System was developed by University of Califomia-
Davis. This system focuses on extending the intrusion detection from single segment of 
network to arbitrary large networks. The architecture for the system include a host manager 
in each host, a LAN manager for monitoring each LAN in the system, and a central manager 
which is in a central secure host and receives event reports from hosts and LAN managers, 
processes these reports, correlates events and generates intrusion alarms. In DIDS, the 
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monitoring and analysis tasks are distributed among the hosts and LAN managers. The hosts 
and LAN managers are responsible for detecting intrusion on one host or one segment of 
network and matching intrusion signatures. The center manager gets distributed audit data 
and correlates events, so it views the system from a central location and detects intrusions 
involving multiple hosts. It also can track tagged objects, for examples, users or files, as they 
migrate from one computer to another inside the network. 
DIDS is similar to our system in that we all use sensors to monitor the hosts and the 
networks, and a central manager to generate alarms. The difference is our system uses formal 
method to model intrusion patterns, while the DIDS uses expert system to develop rules to 
match patterns and use its own language to specify the rules. Another important difference is 
that the correlation function in our system is distributed in several hosts, not a single host like 
DIDS central manager. Not only some functions are distributed on several hosts to reduce the 
vulnerability of central manager, we also implement a technology to make the central host 
attack resistant. 
2.1.2 CIDF [4] 
Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) aims at enabling different intrusion 
detection and response components to interoperate and share information. The CIDF is a 
standard proposed by the Information Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, University of California-Davis, Information Sciences Institute, Odyssey 
Research, and others. CIDF views intrusion detection systems as consisting of discrete 
components that communicate via message passing. CIDF consists of four kinds of intrusion 
detection system components: Event Generators, Event Analyzers, Event Databases and 
Response Units. 
A specification language, Common Intrusion Specification Language (CISL), is also 
proposed to allow independently developed intrusion detection and response systems to share 
information. Using CISL, IDS can disseminate event records, analysis results, and 
countermeasure directives amongst intrusion detection and response components and 
systems. 
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CIDF is a big step towards getting different intrusion detection system to interoperate 
with each other. Since intrusions are taking on a large scale, many attacks can be 
orchestrated over a wide area network, and over a long period of time. So it is very important 
to improve the capability of IDSs, which can be distributed on many locations and developed 
by different vendors, used to share information and to infer possible distributed and 
coordinated intrusion, and to warn others about impending attacks. CIDF and CISL are 
designed to satisfy this need. 
Our system resembles the CIDF in that we use data gathering agents, which 
correspond to Event Generators in CIDF; We use low-level agents, which correspond to 
Event Analyzers in CIDF; and high-level agents which correspond to Decision and Response 
Unit in CIDF. Furthermore we also use database backend to store events, which is like Event 
Database in CIDF. The main difference between our work and CIDF is: CIDF only give a 
framework for intrusion detection system, and no special method is given to detect 
intrusions. Our system uses SFT and CPN to model intrusion and intrusion detection system, 
and uses software agent technology to implement distributed intrusion detection system. 
2.1.3 AAFID 2 [5] 
The Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection (AAFID) project is developed by 
Purdue's CERIAS group. AAFID uses a distributed architecture that utilizes agents to detect 
anomalous or malicious behavior. AAFID first prototype was implemented by a combination 
of programs written in C, Bourne shell, A WK and Perl. Its main objective was to test the 
initial feasibility of the architecture. The second implementation, AAFID 2, is completely 
implemented by Perl 5. It is composed of autonomous agents, transceivers, monitors and user 
interface. Autonomous agents are used to monitor interesting events on host. Transceivers are 
used to control agents and communicate with the agents. Monitors can receive information 
from several transceivers and correlate events. 
AAFID project is an attempt to build distributed intrusion detection system. It is 
scalable, easy to configure and port to other systems. Our system differs with theirs in that 
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we use Java agent technology, and use software engineering technique to model intrusion and 
build software agents automatically. 
In Purdue University, there is also another project called Intrusion Detection in Our 
Time (IDIOT) [25]. This project use CPN as the model to detect misuse intrusion detection. 
IDIOT proposed to use CPN to apply pattern matching in misuse intrusion detection. IDIOT 
used a custom language to describe patterns. We uses CPN to model distributed intrusion 
detection system and CPN is also used to automatically generate intrusion detection agents in 
our work. 
2.1.4 JAM [6] 
The Java Agents for Meta-Leaming (JAM) project at Columbia University uses a 
secured agent infrastructure for continuous learning of fraud and intrusion patterns. This 
system uses two kinds of agents: one is local fraud detection agent that learns how to detect 
fraud and provide intrusion detection services with a single corporate information system, 
and the other is secure, integrated meta-learning agent that combines the collective 
knowledge acquired by individual local agents. 
Our project is quite similar to Java Agent for Meta-Leaming project, both projects use 
Java agent to get distributed information. Our project focuses on using formal method to 
model intrusion and intrusion detection systems, while JAM project does much research on 
using intelligent learning algorithm to generate intrusion detection rules. 
2.1.5 DSRIDA [7] 
The DoS Resistant Intrusion Detection Architecture (DSRIDA) is a project at 
Computer Security Resource Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
IDS may become attack targets on Internet. DoS attack is an attack that is easy to launch and 
difficult to stop. Attacker can obtain the tool for DoS attack in the public domain on the 
Internet. They can use DoS to disable the IDS first, and then carry out their other activity 
without being found. The DoS Resistant Intrusion Detection Architecture is an important step 
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in designing IDS that can resist the DoS attack. Using mobile agent technology, the IDS is 
protected by hiding IDS components and moving them away from attacks. Our project 
resembles this work in the attack resistant approach, on the other hand, formal methods are 
being used to model intrusions and intrusion detection system. 
2.2 Related Technologies 
2.2.1 Use SFT to Model Intrusion 
Software can be unsafe and contain bugs, and design faults. It is unlikely that 
developers will be able to correctly identify all unsafe states that could occur within a 
complex system. In systems where the cost of failure is high, special techniques or tools must 
be used to ensure safe operation. SFT analysis is a tool to analyze the failure of software and 
can provide insight into identifying unsafe states when developing safety critical systems. 
SFT analysis is a top-down approach to the identification of process hazards. It is one 
of the best methods for systematically identifying and graphically displaying the many ways 
a system can go wrong. The root of SFT always represents a hazard, by describing the ways 
in which the system can reach the unsafe state, SFT analysis can help requirement 
specification and system design. 
The SFT analysis used to model the intrusions is a backward search. It begins with an 
intrusion as the root node and traces back through the possible parallel and serial 
combinations of events that caused such an intrusion. SFT analysis of intrusions results in a 
number of benefits, which enables structured analysis of intrusions, including severity and 
probability analysis. SFT analysis assists the intrusion detection system development process 
by modeling intrusions, helps to identify priorities for development, and specifies 
requirements for an intrusion detection system. SFT analysis models of intrusions may assist 
the verification process for an intrusion detection system and identify appropriate 
countermeasures (8]. 
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The use of SFT analysis to model intrusions has been presented in our previous paper 
[8]. In the current prototype, much effort is done to formalize the use of the developed SFT 
to assist the development of an intrusion detection system design. 
2.2.2 Use CPN to Model Intrusion Detection System 
There are various approach to model intrusion detections. Pattern and expression 
matching, rule learning, statistical profiling are three most popular methods for intrusion 
detection algorithm. Colored Petri Net (CPN) is another useful tool to model intrusion 
detection system that is gaining popularity. 
CPN is a graphical oriented language for design, specification, simulation and 
verification of systems [22]. It is well suited for modeling complex and distributed system, 
which demands communication and synchronization between many processes. CPN is 
popular in designing communication protocols, distributed systems, automated production 
systems, workflow analysis and VLSI chips. 
CPN combines the strengths of ordinary Petri Net with the strengths of a high-level 
programming language. Petri Net provides the primitives for process interaction, while the 
programming language provides the primitives for the definition of data types and the 
manipulations of data values. 
CPN has many advantages [9]: 
Intuitive graphical representation: The graphical representation makes it easy to see the 
basic structure of a complex CPN model, to understand the relationship and interaction 
between each module. 
Well-defined semantics: CPNs have a well-defined semantics that enables formal analysis. 
This representation is the foundation for the definition of different behavioral properties and 
analysis methods. 
Allows Time Constraint: CPN models can be made with or without explicit reference to 
time. Untimed CPN models are usually used to validate the functional/logical correctness of 
a system, while timed CPN models are used to evaluate the performance of the system. 
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Allow interactive or automatic simulation: By interactive simulation, the user can 
investigate the different states, investigate different scenarios and check whether the model 
works as expected. This is very convenient for validation. Using automatic simulation, the 
user can inspect the application performance in an application specific view. 
Provide Verification: the formal verification methods are a complement to the more 
informal validation by means of simulation. The use of formal verification is very useful to 
verify the critical system and the critical aspects of a complex system. 
In recent years, CPN has been used in the fault management and security system 
field. It is very well suited for designing IDS because it can describe clearly the complicated 
interaction, classification and correlation activities. And since Intrusion Detection System is 
difficult to test, CPN design of IDS provides an efficient way to verify the design of IDS. 
CPN Model can represent intrusion signatures in more natural way and can do more 
sophisticated matching. 
2.2.3 XML Technology 
XML is designed to describe and store structured information which is used to 
implement communication between different computing systems [10]. XML emerged as a 
useful technology very quickly, and is becoming a standard representation for information 
exchange in many fields, such as web information publication, document content 
representation, book and periodical publishing, real estate transactions, markup languages for 
chemistry, mathematics, music, and many others [26]. 
XML' s flexibility makes it a good choice for implementing the information exchange 
between Intrusion Detection Systems. IETF has proposed several Internet Drafts on using 
XML in Intrusion Detection. One is Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format 
(IDMEF), which defines the data formats and exchange procedures for sharing information 
of interest to intrusion detection and response systems using XML [11]. This Internet Draft 
describes a data model to represent intrusion information that is exported by intrusion 
detection systems, and also presents the implementation of the data model using XML. A 
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XML Document Type Definition (DTD) for the XML representing intrusion detection 
information is also presented in IDMEF. 
Some developments are done to use XML language to exchange intrusive 
information. SnortNet, a distributed intrusion detection system, which is based on SNORT 
[23], uses XML to share intrusive information [12]. 
We use XML technology in our IDS system. We represent the SFT in XML to model 
intrusion. We also represent CPN in XML to model intrusion detection system. A converter 
is developed for the translation from the SFT XML to CPN XML. 
We have reviewed the distributed intrusion detection system, SFT model, CPN 
model, and XML technology for intrusion detection system. In the next section, we will 
explain the Mobile Agent Intrusion Detection System (MAIDS), show how to use SFT to 
represent intrusion, how to use CPN to model intrusion detection system, how to map from 
SFT to CPN, and the design of the SFT to CPN converter. The design of the secure 
infrastructure of MAIDS is also presented. 
3. MAIDS Design 
MAIDS is a distributed IDS based on software mobile agents. It uses SFT to model 
intrusion and CPN to model intrusion detection system. Furthermore, the infrastructure of 
MAIDS is designed to be DoS attack resistant. 
3.1 History of MAIDS 
A distributed intrusion detection system which used lightweight mobile agent of 
Voyager was developed [24]. Agents can travel between monitored systems in a network of 
distributed systems, obtain information from data cleaning agents, classify and correlate 
information, and report the information to a console and database via mediators. This mobile 
agent IDS become the first prototype of MAIDS system. 
From 1998 to 2000, the use of SFT to model intrusion was proposed. An intrusion is 
normally composed of seven stages: Reconnaissance, Vulnerability Identification, 
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Penetration, Control, Embedding, Data Extraction and Attack Relay. The SFT method is used 
to model each of the seven stages [8]. SFT can be used to determine requirements for 
intrusion detection. Fault trees also expose conditions where countermeasures may be 
successfully applied by an intrusion detection system to intervene before the intrusion is 
successful. 
The idea of using formal method such as SFT in intrusion detection keeps evolving. 
In 1999, CPN was used in specifying distributed intrusion detection system. CPN is a popular 
tool in specifying distributed systems. We did research on how to use CPN to describe 
system to detect distributed intrusion, such as FTP Bounce Attack and NFS file handle 
guessing attack. The mobile agent IDS was reimplemented based on CPN specification of 
distributed IDS. SFT is used to model intrusions and CPN is used to specify intrusion 
detection system for MAIDS. 
In the last couple of years, we are focusing on the research of automating the 
generation of intrusion detection software agent. A compiler is implemented to translate CPN 
to intrusion detection agent code [9]. The corresponding relationship between SFT and CPN 
are discovered, and in the current development, a XML translator is designed to translate 
SFT to CPN. The MAIDS system has implemented the automated procedure of generating 
software agents based on SFT description of intrusions. Automating the agent generation 
procedure and making MAIDS easily configured and used by system manager (who may not 
be familiar with MAIDS internals) are some of the goals of MAIDS 2. The other objective is 
to make the MAIDS system as robust to DoS attacks as possible. In MAIDS 2, the system 
design is reviewed and a secure infrastructure is designed and implemented to protect the 
MAIDS from DoS attacks. Proxy agents are designed to hide the critical components of the 
IDS behind the proxies, and back up technology is used to migrate the main components of 
the IDS when it is under attacks. 
3.2 Components of MAIDS 2 Architecture 
3.2.1 Design Goal of MAIDS 2 
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The attackers are constantly attempting to disable IDS. Regardless how powerful an 
IDS could be, if it is disabled then it will be useless. To handle this threat, we design the 
MAIDS 2 to be DoS attack resistant [7]. 
Most IDSs use hierarchical architecture, and it is easy to be disabled. In hierarchical 
architecture of IDS, there is one root component, some internal components and leaf 
components. The root component is normally for controlling lower layer components, 
combining the results and reporting the alarms. The internal components are for correlating 
events, data mining and analyzing. The leaf components are for monitoring events, 
generating events and sending the events information to upper components. So in this kind of 
IDS model, the root component is critical. When the root component is disabled, the whole 
IDS cannot function correctly. If the leaf component is disabled, it will only lose the ability 
of collecting event information on one machine. If some internal component is disabled, it 
will lose the ability to analyze the information that is passed from components of its subtree. 
So root component is critical, this work will design a way to protect the critical component 
on the root. 
A Distributed IDS using the hierarchical architecture is attack resistant if: 
1. No critical host can be penetrated or have its location discovered by an attacker. 
2. No critical agent can be disabled by an attacker unless the attacker can disable the 
entire backbone network in that host's domain. In [7], the concept of these two properties for 
an attack resistant hierarchical IDS is demonstrated. 
3.2.2 SFT Model oflntrusions 
In MAIDS, SFT is used as the starting point of generating agent code for intrusion 
detection. An intrusion is modeled as a SFT first, then the SFT is converted to a CPN, which 
is used to generate agent code. Figure 1 is a SFT model for FTP Bounce Attack [8]. 
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3.2.3 SFT to CPN Translator 
CPN detector for the distributed attacks is described in [8]. Figure 2 is the graph 
representation of CPN for FTP Bounce Attack [9]. 
(FTP _PORT, seql) r (FTP ]ORT_OK, seq2) 
[seq I+ 1 = seq2] FTP PORT & 
FTP PORT OK - -
[seq2 + 1 = seq3] J 
! (FTP_ RETR, seq3, tfrne3) 
FTP_RETR I 
i 
{ (FTP_ RSH _CONN, time4) 
[time3 < time4J .--, -FT_P ___ R_S_H ___ c_o,_N_N__,j 
i 
(FTP_ RETR _OK, seq5, time5) 
[seq3 + 1 = seq5 && time4 < time5] J FTP _RETR_OK I 
i 
0 
Figure 2. CPN for FTP Bounce Attack 
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Figure 2 represents the process of detecting the FTP PORT request event and FTP 
PORT OK event on relay machine, the subsequent FTP RSH CONNECTION event on 
victim machine, and FTP RETRIEVE OK event on relay machine. After these serial events 
are detected to happen according to the time constraint, the complete attack is inferred [9]. 
3 .2 .3 .1 SFT to CPN mapping 
SFT diagram is composed of four basic elements - AND nodes, AND nodes with 
constraints, OR nodes and leaf nodes. Our early work provides the following SFT elements 
to CPN elements mapping [ 13]. 
An AND node unconstrained by an ordering in a SFT corresponds to a transition and 
outgoing place pair in a CPN. An AND node with n inputs translates to a transition with n 
incoming arcs. Each incoming arc comes from either a token source place of a SFT leaf node, 
or the outgoing place of a SFT AND or OR node. 
Nodes connected to an AND node in a SFT may have an attached constraint that 
requires the nodes to become true in some particular order. Two cases exist: first, nodes may 
be required to become true in a specified order, but intervening events may occur; second, 
nodes may be required to become true in a specified order with no intervening events. 
The ordering constraints in SFT description make the SFT approach a more accurate 
model, and when using in Intrusion Detection System, it is helpful in reducing false alarm. 
To support ordering, CPN tokens are required to contain times or sequence numbers. 
When any of the child nodes of an OR node in a SFT are true, the OR node is true. 
An OR node in a SFT corresponds to one or more transitions and one outgoing place pair in a 
CPN. An OR node with n inputs translates to n transitions, each having one incoming arc. 
Each incoming arc comes from either a token source place based on a SFT leaf node, or the 
outgoing place based on a AND or OR node. The translations is shown in figures 3-6: 
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z x 
x y 
Figure 3. Unconstrained AND node 
z (x, timel) (y, time2) 
~ t 
[time]< time2] '~--,.--~ 
i 
x y 0 
OccursA.fter(X, }/ 
Figure 4. AND node constrained by "Y after X" 
z (x, seql) (y, seq2) 
t t 
[seq] + 1 = seq2} '~--,.--~ 
i 
x y 0 
lmmediatelyA.fter(X, Y,l 
Figure 5. AND node constrained by "Y immediately after X" 
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z x y 
Figure 6. OR node 
3.2.3.2 Augment the SFT by Event Specification 
Defining token types in the conversion from SFT to CPN is more difficult than 
generation of places and transitions because this is a fundamental difference between SFT 
and CPN. SFT describes what constructs a hazard at a conceptual level and the event 
described in SFT is not as detailed as in data level. But for CPN, especially for CPN that is 
used to generate a program, more detail is needed to describe what constitutes an event. 
For a leaf node (which corresponds to a token source place) in a SFT, we need to add 
some explanation to the event in SFT. When the SFT is translated to CPN, we then have the 
necessary information about what constitutes the event and what kind of token should be 
generated by the corresponding event. For example, ifthe event is FTP _PORT_OK, we may 
add an explanation in the representation of the SFT like type="RESPONSE", src_port="21 ", 
value="2xx". 
3.2.3.3 Automatic Translation from SFT to CPN 
Based on the specification of translating from SFT to CPN templates described in 
Session 3.2.3.1, a SFT was translated to CPN manually in earlier version of MAIDS. In 
MAIDS 2, to automate the procedure of intrusion detection agent generation, an Extensible 
Style Sheet Language (XSL) based program is implemented to translate from a SFT to the 
corresponding CPN automatically. Then, together with the CPN to agent compiler, new 
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intrusion detection software agents can be automatically generated given a SFT requirement 
for detecting an intrusion. 
XSL is used to design the translation program. Using XSL to do the translation has 
the following advantages: 
First, using XML to represent domain knowledge for exchange purpose is emerging 
very quickly as a viable technique [10]. XML is becoming a standard representation method 
for information exchange. Some design tools for SFT, such as Galileo[26], plans to support 
XML. Some CPN tools, such as Design/CPN [16], support XML. 
Second, using XSL to retrieve information in one XML format and then reorganizing 
and representing it in another format of XML file is very straightforward. The W3C 
Recommendation XSL Transformations (XSL T) Version 1.0 describes how to write XSL to 
transform from one XML file to another XML file [ 14]. 
Third, it is flexible, and easy to modify the XSL program to translate from a XML 
format which is generated from a different SFT tool. It is also easy to modify the XSL 
program to translate into a XML format which can be recognized by a different CPN tool. 
Fourth, it is efficient as the XSL translation program executes very fast. 
To perform the automatic translation, a SFT for an intrusion is first designed using a 
SFT tool. For this step, we use Visual XML Writer to design the SFT [15]. We also designed 
a Document Type Definition (DTD) for the XML representation of SFT. 
Then, we used the XSL program to translate· SFT XML to CPN XML. This XML 
translation is executed using an XSL transformer program in Visual XML Writer. 
Subsequently we can view and validate the CPN that is translated from SFT using 
Design/CPN. During this step, optimization can be performed on the CPN to improve the 
efficiency of CPN. Figure 7 illustrates the procedure. 
SFT design of an 
intrusion 
View and optimize CPN in 
CPN/design 
21 
XSL translator 
Figure 7. Procedure of generating CPN from SFT 
3.2.4 CPN to Intrusion Detection Agent Compiler 
In our early work, a tool that automatically translates a CPN specifying an intrusion 
detection system into a software intrusion detection agent has been designed and 
implemented [9]. 
Each of the three basic elements in CPN - places, transitions and arcs corresponds to 
a certain class in the software agent system. The compiler comprises of two distinct stages. A 
set of objects, which hold information about the three CPN elements mentioned above serves 
as the interface between these two stages. The first stage parses the CPN representation, 
extracts information about each CPN element and populates these objects. The second stage 
uses the data stored in these objects to generate agent code. Figure 8 shows the 
implementation of compiler that translates CPN to software agents [9]. 
Changes ifCPN 
representation changes 
... 
I 
I 
I 
--..,---'-------
.. 
Changes if MAIDS 
code changes 
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CPN 
Representation 
Parser 
Code Generator 
Figure 8. Implementation of MAIDS 2 Compiler 
3.2.5 Secure Infrastructure of MAIDS 2 
Another feature of MAIDS 2 is that it is developed to be an attack-resistant, i.e., it can 
resist the attacks that can disable normal IDS, such as Distributed DoS attack. 
3.2.5.l System Architecture 
Figure 9 is CPN that is translated from SFT [17]. 
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C) Alert place . --------------- -------------6------------ ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ------. 
Internal nodes 
··--·-·-··--··-··-·4-·--·--··~--~------------------·-------------· _//{-, \~~----,- i - r_ -_ -r __ 1 __ , __ -1---~---_-_- - , 1 Leaf transitions 
I ___ -~_-_--,- 1 I l __ :_:_:_l-:_j- 1 
- J 
Leaf places 
Figure 9. CPN derived from SFT 
The root place of CPN - the Alert place corresponds to the root node of SFT_ The 
root node of SFT is the representation of a hazard, while the root place of CPN corresponds 
to the software agent that reports alert to console. 
The internal nodes of SFT correspond to internal nodes in CPN, which correspond to 
mobile agents that can move around the monitored host or stationary agents in the monitored 
host. Leaf places correspond to stationary agents that are responsible for getting monitoring 
data. The overall structure of the software agent system is illustrated in figure 10 [ 17]. 
Monitored host 
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Analysrs locBlion 
Con1Dle 
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Data flow: 
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,. : Monitored host ' ' ' 
' I 
' 
Figure 10. MAIDS architecture 
Moritored hast '·, · ', ·· ... " \\ 
At each monitored host there is a local database which stores local events, an agent 
server which holds mobile agents, and an assortment of local data sources. At the analyst's 
location there is another agent server and a console application that serves as an 
administrative role for all agent servers. This administrative role includes maintenance of 
lists of monitored hosts and active agents. The DCPN's root place corresponds to an agent 
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operating in the analyst's machine. Tokens that reach the place are displayed in a window of 
the console application. 
Leaf places correspond to stationary agents. Each leaf place in the original CPN is 
duplicated by multiple software agents at hosts throughout the network, and is responsible for 
creating tokens and holding them until they are picked up by mobile agents. A group of 
identical software agents corresponding to a leaf place are considered a single entity by the 
console agent manager. A leaf place may be in communication with a local database that is 
being populated by some local data sources, or it may be in direct communication with those 
data sources. 
The architecture that is derived directly from CPN is not attack resistant. We 
improve the design by inserting proxies between the administrative host and monitored hosts 
as well as adding backup ability to make it attack resistant. 
3.2.5.2 Design of the MAIDS 2 with Attack Resistant Capability 
Most IDSs use active IDS response, such as adding filters to firewall and 
reconfiguring the computers, to defend the hosts. To defend against a DoS attack to the 
critical host, these IDSs usually reconfigure some routers to stop the attack. The 
disadvantages of this method are: 
(1) The responses are slow and not efficient, because DoS attack, especially 
Distributed DoS attack (DDoS), is not easily to be stopped as there are many 
machines involved in the attack. It always takes several hours or even days to stop 
aDDoS. 
(2) Some useful traffic is blocked sometimes by applying filter to routers. 
(3) Attacker can use fake IP addresses, so it is not easy to block the bad traffic. 
Instead of stopping attacks to the critical host, we use a strategy of hiding and evading 
to avoid the harm of the attack. 
We use the following two measures: 
First, we hide the critical host. The attacker must find out the host where the critical 
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component of IDS is in order to launch the DoS attack, we counter this by making the critical 
host invisible. 
The typical scenario for a DoS attack against IDS will be: an attacker use some tools 
to penetrate one or more non-critical, perhaps not well protected hosts, then by sniffing on 
the compromised machines, the attacker can get some knowledge about the topology of the 
network, including where the location of the critical host of IDS is. Then the attacker will 
launch DoS attack to the critical host to bring down the IDS. 
To stop attacker from getting the IP address of IDS by sniffing on other hosts, we add 
some proxy hosts, which sit between the critical host and non-critical hosts. The critical host 
and the non-critical hosts can only communicate directyly with proxy hosts. So there is no 
direct communication between non-critical hosts and critical hosts. The proxy hosts and 
critical hosts are put behind strictly configured firewall, while the other hosts can be placed 
elsewhere. Figure 11 illustrates the relations between critical hosts, proxy hosts and non-
critical hosts. 
In this way, the attacker can find out some non-critical hosts, and by sniffering on 
non-critical host, they can find out corresponding proxy hosts and disable proxy host by DoS 
attack. Then the IDS lost monitoring ability of this domain under this proxy, but it still 
functions well in the other domains under other proxies. The attacker cannot find out critical 
hosts since critical hosts are hidden behind the proxies. Only if all domains are penetrated 
and all proxies are disabled, the IDS will be totally disabled. 
Second, we use back up technology to back up the IDS to another host when it is 
attacked by DoS or some other serious attack. Although we take the measure to prevent the 
critical host from being found, the critical host can still be exposed by neglect or is hit 
randomly. So we design the IDS to relocate itself to a new critical machine to evade the 
harm. 
The new MAIDS 2 architecture with these two features is showed in figure 11 : 
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Backup administrative console 
Administrative console 
/..-·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·~. 
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~-·-·-·- -·-·-·-·--
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\ 
Monitghost 1 0 
Monitored host 2 
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' -- - -·-·-·-·--·-·-·-·-·-·/ I \ 
0 0 
Monitored host 4 
Monitored host 3 
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0 
0 
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Non-critical host 
Proxy host 
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I 
Figure 11. Architecture of MAIDS 2 with backup ability and proxy agent 
4. Implementation 
4.1 Implementation of XML Translator 
There are many kinds of XML tools available, and we use Visual XML Writer from 
elntemet Studios [15]. Visual XML Writer can be used to create and manage XML, XSL 
Stylesheets, Document Type Definition (DTD). We use Visual XML Writer to design and 
view SFT XML, and also use it to design DTD and XSL. 
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We designed a DTD for SFT; the DTD for the CPN is defined by Design/CPN tool 
[16]. We also designed a XSL converter that is used to translate from SFT XML to CPN 
XML. 
4.1.l SFT DTD 
A SFT DTD is designed first. Following is the Unified Model Language (UML) [18] 
description of the SFT DTD. 
(a) SFT 
Software Fault Tree 
Figure 12. UML for SFT 
(b) And Gate 
And Gate 
Name 
Figure 13. UML for And gate of SFT 
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In SFT for Intrusion Detection, there are some time constraints, which are 
represented by 'Condition' here. 
(c) Or Gate 
Or Gate 
Name 
(d) Event 
Event 
Name 
Tep 
Connection 
O .. * And Gate 
O .. * 
Or Gate 
O .. * 
Event 
Figure 14. UML for OR gate of SFT 
O .. * 
Command 
type 
rtype 
src 
Explain 
dst 
src_port 
dst_port 
value 
tabletag 
Figure 15. UML for Leaf node of SFT 
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There is no corresponding node in normal SFT for the 'Explain' element in Figure 
15. Since our SFT is used for generating CPN, which needs more detailed description of 
the event, we add this item. 
In this work, we focus on two kinds of events. One is "Tep Connection", which 
represents TCP connection event from one host to another host. The other is 
"Command", which represents COMMAND that is sent in TCP connections, for 
examples, "PORT", "RETR" in FTP procedure. 
( e) Condition 
Immediately 
After 
Condition 
Name 
First Event Within 
Name 
Second Event 
Name 
Figure 16. UML for Time Constraints in SFT 
Based on the UML described above, we designed a DTD for SFT XML. 
First Event 
Name 
Second Event 
Name 
Duration 
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4.1.2 XML Translator 
A XML translator based on XSL Translation (XSLT) protocol is used to extract 
information from SFT XML, and generates CPN XML. We program a XSL file according to 
the corresponding relationship between SFT and CPN we described in session 3.2.3.1. 
The XSL program will do the conversion according to following steps: 
(1) Generate header for the CPN XML file, include the CPN DTD in the header. 
(2) Generate the root place in CPN 
(3) Generate leaf places: 
Leaf nodes in SFT are corresponding to token source places in CPN. Leaf nodes are 
partitioned in several classes, and each class corresponds to one kind of events. Leaf nodes in 
the same class generate tokens with the same color. We generate leaf places by: 
Scan the SFT for all the different classes of leaf nodes, and generate one leaf place 
(token place) for each class. 
(4) Scan the SFT, for each "AND gate" that is found from the SFT XML, generate 
one place, one transition (with some conditions) and one arc from the transition to the place. 
One outgoing arc from the place with corresponding token string is also generated. For each 
input event to the "AND gate", generate one incoming arc to the transition and corresponding 
token string. 
(5) Scan the SFT, for each "OR gate" that is found from SFT XML, generate one 
outgoing place; For each input event to the "OR gate", generate one transition, one incoming 
arc to the transition with corresponding token string, and one output arc with corresponding 
token string from the transition to the place. 
Tokens must include enough information for token matching and unification in the 
CPN. Attributes such as temporal information, source & destination addresses, and port 
information are normally included to describe an event on network. 
(6) Generate declaration component. The colors definition and variable declaration 
are needed for the CPN. The colors used for the CPN are specified first, for example, 
IP _ENDS or IP _QUAD. Then the SFT is scanned to find all the variables that must be 
declared. 
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4.2 Implementation of Back Up Functionality and Proxy Agent 
The MAIDS is currently implemented using Voyager 4.5 [19]. On each monitored 
machine, a voyager server is running as a platform for the mobile agents. On the 
administrative machine, a voyager server is run to host the alert place and serve as the 
creation point for all software agents. On proxy machine, a voyager server is running to host 
the mobile agents. We also run a voyager server on backup machine to accept backup agents. 
4.2. l MAIDS Agent Architecture 
The hierarchy of the agent classes is give in figure 17 [9]: 
MaidsAgent 
(interface) 
/~ 
T~nsiti~n (austractJ 
IP lace 
(interface) 
/\ P!MWP~ 
Mobile Transition 
(abstract) 
! custom agents i 
StationaryT ransition 
(abstract) 
... · ........ .. 
! custom agents i 
Figure 17. Agent Class Architecture 
Data Place 
(abstract) 
·· ... 
i custom agents : 
Leaf (data source) places - The responsibility of a data place is to generate fresh 
tokens from information collected locally. It must implement a workO method, taking no 
arguments and returning a Token Bag. This method is called periodically within the 
DataPlace superclass code. 
Leaf (mobile) transitions - This embodies both the topology and behavior of the 
CPN. This must implement the following methods 
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Java. fang. String[} sourcesO; 
Java. fang String[} tokenSpecO; 
Token[} unify (Token[] sourceTokens); 
Of these the only non-trivial method is 'unify'. This method decides whether the 
tokens passed to it should be unified. If so it returns a new array of tokens; else it returns 
null. 
Internal places - No special agent needs to be written for this as it only serves as a 
container. 
Internal transitions - These are very similar to Leaf transitions with the only 
difference being that they need not be mobile. 
Root (console) place - There is no need to instantiate the root place. This is 
automatically done by the MAIDS console which implements the JP/ace interface and 
identifies itself in the CPN with the alert label. 
4.2.2 Implementation of MAIDS Backup Ability 
Since not all agents in critical host are serializable, not all of them can be wrapped as 
mobile agents and sent to backup machine. So what we do is starting another MAIDS 
console on the backup host, wrapping some data, and then sending these data to the backup 
MAIDS console. Figure 18 shows the flow of control in MAIDS. 
No 
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Initialzation of MAIDS( load proxy 
agents, create mobile agents and send 
to target machine) 
Check for alert token and add alert to 
alert window of console. 
Yes 
Wrap monitored machine and agent information and 
start an IDS on back up machine. Shutdown MAIDS 
on this machine. 
Figure 18. Flow of control in MAIDS system 
To detect DoS attack on the administrative machine, we integrate a DoS Intrusion 
Detection program [20] with MAIDS. This DoS intrusion detection program is written in 
Linux kernel level. It checks the system resource usage, when the usage of CPU, memory or 
the number of opened files is above certain thresholds, it will issue a DoS attack alert. The 
administrator can set the limit of system resource usage in this program. Another program is 
designed to retrieve the information from the DoS intrusion detection program and insert the 
intrusion information into an event database. The MAIDS agent can retrieve the DoS event 
from the database and report to the console. 
MAIDS console 
Proxy server 
Agent server 
Event database on 
monitored host 
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Figure 19. Architecture for backup procedure 
4.2.3 Implementation of Proxy Agent 
Kernel 
space 
Variable 
set in kernel 
DoS detect 
program 
Communication between administrative and monitored host is described m the 
following steps: 
• The administrative console send mobile agent to monitored host 
• From the administrative host, messages are sent to the mobile agent, such as killing 
an agent. 
• From the monitored host, messages are sent to the administrative host, such as firing a 
token to transitions on the administrative host. 
To use proxy host as the intermediate station between administrative and monitored 
hosts, we need to define a proxy agent class. And for each of the above three kinds of remote 
operations between the administrative host and monitored host, we define and implement an 
interface function in proxy agent class. The MAIDS system will: 
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Generate proxy agent for each proxy, and 
For the above three kinds of remote operations between the administrative host and 
monitored host, it will first look up the namespace to find the appropriate proxy for the target 
host, and then call the corresponding proxy function to execute its specified task. 
Voyager provides different implementations of names services, such as Voyager 
federated directory server, CORBA naming server, JNDI [19]. It also provides a single and 
simple interface, a class named "Namespace" to offer related functions, such as 
• Lookup: Returns an interface to the object associated with the specified name 
• Bind: Associate the specified name with object 
• Unbind: Disassociates the specified name 
We use the Voyager default naming service- federated directory server to implement 
the proxy register and lookup function, the proxy generation and lookup code is as follows: 
( 1) Proxy generation: 
Factory.create("MAIDS.Proxy Agent", "//proxyhostname:proxyport/Proxy"); 
(2) Proxy lookup: 
!Proxy Agent 
proxy=(IProxyAgent)(Namespace.lookup("//proxyhostname:proxyport/Proxy"); 
(3) Use proxy to implement remote call: 
proxy.remoteCall( classname, remotelocation); 
By this schema, the administrative host communicates with monitored hosts using 
proxies, and is hidden behind the proxy and cannot be seen from monitored hosts. 
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5. Testing and Result 
5.1 Test Cases 
5 .1.1 FTP Bounce Attack 
This attack exploits a weakness in certain FTP daemons and a trust relationship 
between two hosts. A detailed explanation of this attack is provided in [8]. The basic steps 
involved are: 
• Create a malicious egg file. Egg file is a file containing a valid remote shell (RSH) 
command. 
• Identify a vulnerable FTP server (relay host) and a host which trusts the relay host 
and is running the RSH daemon (victim host). 
• Upload the egg file to the relay host using PUT command. 
• Redirect the output of the FTP server to the victim's RSH port using the PORT 
command. 
• Download the egg file directly to the RSH port of the victim host using RETR 
command. 
• The victim host accepts the egg file as a SSH command to be run as root user. 
5.1.2 DoS Attack 
There are many kinds of DoS attack. We generate a simple DoS attack by making 
requests to web server of the victim machine rapidly to consume huge amount of system 
resources. The apache web server on Linux machine will fork new processes when all current 
processes are busy. By rapidly requesting web content, more processes are generated, the 
CPU and memory usage can increase drastically. This is a simple DoS attack. We also 
designed programs to consume the system resources such as memory and CPU intensively to 
test the system response to DoS attack [20]. 
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5.2 SFT to CPN Translator Test 
We designed and wrote a SFT XML for FTP Bounce Attack using Visual XML 
Writer, and then use the XSL converter to translate it to CPN XML. The CPN XML is 
readable by DESIGN/CPN. Figure 20 is the CPN diagram in DESIGN/CPN for FTP Bounce 
Attack that is generated automatically from SFT XML using this XSL program. As we can 
see, the automatically generated CPN is similar to the hand written one except for it includes 
more information and is in more detail. 
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Figure 20. CPN automatically generated from SFT of FTP BOUNCE ATTACK 
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5.3 Proxy and Back Up Functionality Test 
We set up a lab environment as figure 21 to test the functionality of the MAIDS. 
Proxy 
Figure 21. Setup for MAIDS test with proxy and backup ability 
Monitored hostl, Monitored host2 are two machines that are being monitored. 
Backup host is for MAIDS console backup. Attacker! attacks using FTP Bounce Attack; 
Attacker2 attacks using DoS attack. 
5.3.1 Proxy Functionality 
We test to see if the MAIDS system functions well with proxies. We use FTP Bounce 
Attack as test case. A vulnerable FTP Server on Monitored Host2 is used so it can function as 
the relay machine for FTP Bounce Attack. FTP Bounce Attack is launched to compromise 
Monitored hostl using Monitored host2 as a relay machine. We observed the following 
result: 
1. When a distributed attack is launched, the attack alarm are raised on the 
administrative machine 
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2. When normal FTP operations and SSH operations or combination of these two 
operations are performed, there are some places generated, but no attack alarm 
generated. 
3. Observing from the two monitored machines, there is no connection between the 
administrative machine and monitored machines. 
4. After the firewall is set up on the administrative machine to forbid the traffic from 
monitored machine, the MAIDS works as before. 
5 .3 .2 Back Up Ability 
To test the back up functionality of the MAIDS system, a DoS attack is launched to the 
administrative machine. As expected, 
1. The MAIDS relocates to the backup administrative host. 
2. The former MAIDS console is closed. 
3. When other attacks launched, such as FTP Bounce Attack, the MAIDS system on the 
backup Machine can detect the attack. 
4. MAIDS can backup between the first administrative machine and the backup 
administrative machines. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
The advantage of MAIDS is that it generates intrusion detection agent automatically. 
Given a SFT which specifies an intrusion, intrusion detection software agents can be 
generated and integrated into original MAIDS system automatically. 
Given a SFT describing an intrusion, the XSL translator presented in this paper can 
be used to translate the SFT to CPN which describes intrusion detection system. After this, a 
compiler can be used to translate the CPN into software intrusion detection agent. 
Administrator need not understand the internal details of the MAIDS implementation, this 
make MAIDS easy to use. 
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The IDS are always target of attacks on the Internet. By using the backup and proxy design, 
the MAIDS can hide itself from attacks and can evade when it is attacked. This ability allows MAIDS 
survivable under DDoS attacks, which are easy to launch and difficult to stop. 
6.2 Future Work 
6.2.1 Anomaly Intrusion 
At this time, the MAIDS is a misuse Intrusion Detection System, and it can only 
detect known intrusions. There are always unknown intrusions, an anomaly Intrusion 
Detection module should be developed and added to the MAIDS. Anomaly detection 
algorithms always have high false alarm rate, it would be very helpful to develop CPN model 
to correlate anomalies with related activities to reduce the false alarm rate. 
6.2.2 Formal Proof of Correctness 
Now the XSLT converter and CPN compiler are used to translate the SFT to CPN and 
CPN to software mobile agents [8]. For simple SFT it is easy to see that the translation is 
correct, but for more complicated one that is not so obvious. If we can develop formal proof 
methodology that the translation indeed preserves the correctness of SFT representation, then 
great confidence is gained for the correctness of the automatic intrusion detection agent 
generation system of MAIDS. 
6.2.3 Robustness of Proxy 
The critical host is backupable in MAIDS, but proxies become the weakest link. 
When one proxy is attacked and disabled, one domain under this proxy will be out of 
monitor. It will be better to have several selectable proxies for each domain. When one proxy 
is disabled, the MAIDS can use another available proxy. 
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